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COMMENT
LIBEL AND SLANDER-DISPARAGEMENT

OF PRODUCT-ExPANDING

PROTECTION AGAINST TRADE LIBEL.

To what extent may an advertiser refer to the products or goods of
a. competitor without being subject to legal liability? Clearly, neither a
truthful comparison of readily ascertainable physical characteristics of two
products nor words of disparagement that have a basis in truth are
actionable.' Thus, to say truthfully that car X is ten inches longer than car
Y is not actionable. At the other end of the spectrum, words which though
directed at the quality of the product, in effect impute to the dealer or
maker dishonesty, fraud, deception, or other trade misconduct, are per
se libel and expose the publisher to an action for damages. 2 To state
untruthfully that the furs which X store is selling as real mink are actually
synthetic material would impute fraud to the seller and be actionable as a
personal libel. The area between these two extremes is the subject matter
of this comment. Besides considering the types of statements that are
actionable, the injured merchant's choice of remedies will also be explored.
At this point it should be made clear that not only competitors, but
also dissatisfied customers and even complete strangers may be guilty of
trade libel. Actually, the dissatisfied customer can often be a greater
menace to the well-being of the local merchandiser than the competitor.
Although his remarks may not be as widely disseminated as the latter's,
they reach a more selective class of people - his neighbors and friends who,
in all probability, shop in the same area as he does. Thus, they reach the
merchant's immediate market. Moreover, since these disparagements are
made by a comparatively disinterested party rather than by a competitor,
they are probably given more credence by those who hear them.8 Unlike
a competitor's advertisement which, though damaging, may be taken with
a grain of salt in light of its source and obvious purpose, the words of a
dissatisfied customer are greeted with much less skepticism. This is, of
course, not meant to imply that if a merchant gives poor service and/or
handles second class merchandise, a person should not have a right to
complain and make his views known in a truthful manner; rather it means
that if a customer is untruthful in his criticism he subjects himself to the
same liability as a competitor would.
1. Rosenberg v. J. C. Penny, 30 Cal. App. 2d 609, 86 P.2d 696 (1939).
2. Rosenberg v. J. C. Penny, supra note 1; Le Messena v. Storm, 62 App. Div.
150, 70 N.Y. Supp. 882 (1901).
3. An exception to this statement would probably exist in regard to claims made
in reference to physical facts by well known manufacturers with national reputations.
E.g., the validity of an advertisement by Chevrolet claiming that their car is four
inches longer than a comparable Ford would probably never be questioned by the
general public.

(271)
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There are several ways in which one can verbally injure the product
of another. Disparagements include: (a) stating flatly that X product is
of poor quality, (b) stating that in comparison to our product, X product
is inferior, (c) negative inferences resulting from the unwarranted omission of a product from a listing of similar products made up by an independent third party, or (d) stating that our product Y is better than X,
which, though it inferentially says that X product is inferior, is not actionable as a trade libel. 4 Also, mere puffing or words that disparage a
whole industry are not actionable. The product which has been disparaged does not have to be specifically named, however; if from the
tone of the words or advertisement, only one product could be referred to,
5
then recovery is allowed for the injury.
I.
DAMAGES IN THE STATE COURTS.

The cause of action for trade libel is derived from the action of
slander of title. It is a well recognized principle that damages can be
recovered for false statements made about the quality of goods of another.
Unlike defamation of the person, it makes no difference whether the disparagement is oral or written and truth is always a defense. 6 However,
there are many different views among the states as to what must be
proved in order to recover. Malice is generally required, but the elements
necessary to show malice vary from state to state. They range from a
mere allegation that the defendant acted maliciously, coupled with proof
of the falsity of the statement from which the malice is inferred, 7 to a
requirement that the plaintiff prove that the false statements were intended
to injure his business;8 still another jurisdiction requires proof that the
defendant knew the statement to be false.9 When a non-competitor makes
the remark, a showing that he should have known that the remark was
disparaging has been held to be a sufficient proof of malice. 10 Malice
4. Rosenberg v. J. C. Penny, 30 Cal. App. 2d 609, 86 P.2d 696 (1939).
5. Shaw Cleaners and Dyers v. Des Moines Dress Club, 215 Iowa 1130, 245
S.W. 231 (1932). In this case plaintiff was the only cleaner in town advertising
a half-price special in cleaning clothes. Defendant ran an advertisement saying that
half-price cleaning was half-way cleaning. The defendant did not mention any names
of competitors in the advertisement but the plaintiff was allowed to bring his
cause of action for trade libel.
6. Nowry v. Raabe, 89 Cal. 606, 27 Pac. 157 (1891); Dooling v. Budget
Publishing Co., 144 Mass. 258, 10 N.E. 809 (1887) ; Cosgrove Studio & Camera
Shop v. Pane, 21 Pa. D. & C. 89 (1960). For a general discussion of the growth
of this cause of action see BOWtR, ACTIONABLE DEFAMATION 210 (2d ed. 1923)
Smith, Disparagement of Property, 13 COLUM. L. Rev. 121 (1913).
7. Shaw Cleaners and Dyers v. Des Moines Dress Club, 215 Iowa 1130, 245
S.W. 231 (1932).
8. Mowry v. Raabe, 89 Cal. 606, 27 Pac. 157 (1891).

9. Blens Chemical, Inc. v. Wyandotte Chemical Corp., 197 Misc. 1066, 96
N.Y.S.2d 47 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
10. Paramount Pictures, Inc. v. Leader Press, Inc., 106 F.2d 229 (10th Cir.
1939) ; Comment, 63 YALn L.J. 65, 82-84 (1954).
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thus has a chameleon character that varies according to the jurisdiction
in which the action arises. Where a disinterested party, who is neither a
competitor nor an owner of a brand X car, disparages X cars, malice is
quite easy to prove under any of the above tests. Where the interested
party who makes the remark is a dissatisfied customer, malice is still quite
easily shown. But when the interested party is a competitor, proof of
malice may be more difficult since it can be argued that probably one's
primary purpose is to sell his own product and thus advance his property
interest rather than to tear down his rival's. This difficulty would be most
notable in those jurisdictions which require an actual intent to injure the
plaintiff in his business." The greatest difficulty arises when one seeks
to prove malice on the part of a disinterested medium which transmitted
the remark, such as a newspaper which published a disparaging advertisement. This obstacle is undoubtedly the reason why no cases have
been found in which a suit for damages has been instituted solely against
such a disinterested party.
In most jurisdictions the real problem and chief obstacle in the path
of recovery for product libel is the requirement that plaintiff prove special
damages. With the exception of two states,12 special damages are essential
to recovery, and allegations of general damages and a general decline in
business are insufficient.' 3 The traditional notion of special damages is that
in order to recover plaintiff must specify the names of customers lost
because of the false disparagement. 14 This has made recovery almost an
impossibility. It is an extremely difficult task to find a customer who
declines to trade with a merchant because of a trade libel and it is almost
impossible to find new customers who would have traded with the merchant but for the disparagement. When old customers cease to trade, the
neighborhood storekeeper probably has little idea of who these people are
and where they can be contacted; the owner of a large establishment would
have even less idea. Thus the requirement is entirely unrealistic and
overly burdensome and may explain why the action for trade libel is neither
11. However, not one case was found which was reversed on the ground that
the requisite malice was not present.
12. In Mowry v. Raabe, 89 Cal. 606, 27 Pac. 157 (1891), defendant said that
plaintiff sold diseased meat. There was no allegation of special damages and
plaintiff was allowed recovery for general damages. In Pendleton v. Time, Inc.,
339 11. App. 188, 89 N.E.2d 435 (1949), defendant published a portrait of President
Truman saying it was the first portrait done of him. Defendant knew that plaintiff
had done the first portrait of the President. Plaintiff sued for general damages for
loss of reputation and commissions without a specific showing of lost customers.
The court allowed these allegations to stand in reversing a motion to strike. In
Advance Music Corp. v. American Tobacco Co., 296 N.Y. 79, 70 N.E.2d 401
(1946), defendant never included any of plaintiff's music in its top ten selections.
There was no allegation of special damages in the traditional sense but in a later
case, Blens Chemical, Inc. v. Wyandotte Chemical Corp., 197 Misc. 1066, 96
N.Y.S2d 47 (Sup. Ct. 1950), New York held that special damages still had to be
proved.
13. Cosgrove Studio & Camera Shop v. Pane, 21 Pa. D. & C. 2d 89 (1960).
14. Shaw Cleaners & Dyers v. Des Moines Dress Club, 215 Iowa 1130. 245
S.W. 231 (1932) ; Cosgrove Studio & Camera Shop v. Pane, supra note 13.
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a well-known nor a frequently used remedy.' 5 It is not surprising, therefore,
that courts in some jurisdictions have relaxed these standards in analogous
libel cases where recovery for loss of business is sought. In a personal libel
action where the plaintiff also sought recovery of special damages for the
loss of business, a showing that a large number of old and established
patients of a dentist cancelled their appointments"6 and that there had
been a sharp decline in the number of new patients normally to be expected,
was held sufficient for a recovery of special damages. 7 In an action for
slander of credit, in which special damages were alleged for loss of
business, it was held that it is not always necessary to name the customers
whose business was lost because of the defamation.18 In another case,
when plaintiff showed that his average net income dropped from $300 to
$100 per week after the alleged libel, recovery was allowed for the lost
profits.' 9 In these cases the courts realized that to show specific lost
customers is a practical impossibility which, in effect, prevents recovery.
While these cases do not deal with trade libel, they are similar in that
recovery in each was contingent upon a showing of special damages to
business; therefore, it seems that courts should be receptive to an argument that more lenient standards of proof are also sufficient to prove
special damages in trade libel cases.
While the accepted view of special damages is felt to be too restrictive, the view of these other cases may actually be too broad in that it tends
to disregard the problem of causation. A general decline in business,
evidenced by records kept in the ordinary course of business,
should definitely be admissible to prove loss. But these records should not
be proof per se. The plaintiff should also be required to prove that neither

(1) was there a decline in business in general, nor (2) was the loss
attributable to a natural decline in demand for his particular product.
These two requirements are not as formidable as they may seem and
indeed are much easier to satisfy than it is to show lost customers. Either
the records of stores dealing in like products or recognized market reports
would be acceptable proof of the general level of business activity and the
level of demand for the type of product involved. Also, if the business is
nation-wide, proof of a drop in business in the locale where the derogatory
remarks were made, while business remained the same or advanced in
other areas, would be a sufficient showing that the trade libel caused the
loss of business and that it did not result from other factors. If these two
15. Recovery has been very sparse in this area and most of the reported cases
deal with the problem of sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint. The requirement that a merchant find lost customers can be compared to asking a fisherman
to find the fish in the lake that did not take his bait. At worst, this requirement
could even prompt a merchant to manufacture lost customers in order to recover
losses sustained from a trade libel which he otherwise could not prove.
16. Professional men are unusual in this field in that they, unlike the average
shopkeeper, generally enjoy a closer relationship with their customers.
17. Mac Leod v. Tribune Publishing Co., 52 Cal. 536, 343 P.2d 36 (1959).
18. Davis v. Trust Co. of New Jersey, 26 N.J. Misc. 111, 57 A.2d 380 (1948).
19. Walker v. Sheehan, 80 Ga. App. 606, 56 S.E.2d 628 (1949).
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requirements are included, a rule permitting special damages to be proved
by showing a decline in business would be a desirable advance in the

action for trade libel; for it is obviously inequitable to allow a person
to disparage the quality of another's product with impunity because a too

strict requirement for the proof of damages prevents effective redress.
II.
INJUNCTIONS IN THE STATE COURTS.

Where the disparagement is continuous, the quest by the injured
merchant for injunctive relief in equity has met with more success than his
excursions into law courts. While it was once true that equity would not
enjoin a trade libel no matter how great the harm to the merchant's
property rights and how inadequate other remedies might be,20 this is no
longer true. Although an injunction for a trade libel by itself has been
allowed in only one case,2 1 equity courts have not been reluctant to act
and enjoin false words once something more than a trade libel alone is
shown. There are many ways in which equity has taken jurisdiction in
these cases, but not all states have granted relief on the same facts or for
the same reasons. It has been held that if the plaintiff gets a
judgment at law first and then it is shown that this is inadequate
because of the insolvency of the defendant, equity will issue an
injunction. 22 Because of the practical difficulties discussed above recovering a legal judgment for damages, this remedy in equity is of little
value. The fact that insolvency of a defendant is not a usual ground of
equity jurisdiction has also deterred the majority of states from using
this ground for relief. The most usual ground occurs when the continuing
acts of the defendant are motivated by malice and the unjustified disparagement causes irreparable injury to the plaintiff's business. 23 The repetition
of the action and the inability of a court of law to prevent continued
conduct give equity grounds for jurisdiction over and above the trade

libel and thus it will enjoin the wrongful conduct including the trade
libel. 24 An injunction has also been issued for product disparagement
20. A. Hollander & Sons, Inc. v. Jos. Hollander, Inc., 117 N.J. Eq. 578, 177 Ati.
80 (1935); Singer v. Romerrick Realty Corp., 255 App. Div. 715, 5 N.Y.S.2d 607
(1938); Marlin Firearms Co. v. Shields, 171 N.Y. 384, 64 N.E. 163 (1902).
21. Gilly v. Hirsch, 122 La. 966, 48 So. 422 (1909). The Massachusetts courts
have been lavish in the scope of the words they have used to define equity jurisdiction. The Supreme Judicial Court said in Kenyon v. City of Chicopee, 320 Mass.
528, 70 N.E.2d 241 (1946), that the jurisdiction of equity includes the prevention
of unlawful interference with a person's right to carry on a business in general
and it extends to the protection of a business against repeated libels or disparagement
of goods. However, no case has tested the value of this dictum. See, Advance
Music Corp. v. American Tobacco Co., 296 N.Y. 79, 70 N.E.2d 401 (1946).
2. Wolf v Harris, 267 Mo. 405, 184 S.W. 1139 (1916).
23. National
Life
Co. v. Myers, 241
140 Ill. App. 392 (1908); Kenyon v. City
Mass.Ins.
of Chicopee
24. J. C. 320
Pitman
&528,
Sons70 v.N.E.2d
Pitman, 29 (1946).
Del. Ch. 189, 47 A.2d 721 (1946);
Krebiozen Research Foundation v. Beacon Press, 334 Mass. 86, 134 N.E.2d I
(1956); Menard v. Houle, 298 Mass. 546, 11 N.E.2d 436 (1937); Davis v. New
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where two or more defendants were involved and the trade libel was
motivated by a conspiracy to harm plaintiff's business, or an attempt to
intimidate or coerce the plaintiff to do something or to extort something
from him.25 Moreover, where it can be shown that the damages at law
are inadequate because of the impossible task of finding customers who
were lost, at least one jurisdiction will grant equitable relief. 26 Equity
will also act when it can be shown that the disparagement is more than a
mere trade libel and that it was made with the intent to injure the
plaintiff's business. 27 This particular facet of equity jurisdiction is particularly applicable to competitors since it is almost a foregone conclusion
that the disparaging remarks were made to injure his rival's business even
though his main intent may have been to sell his own product. A final
ground for equity jurisdiction, applicable only to competitors, is unfair
competition. 28 On a showing of unfair competition because of the disparagement of the product, equity will enjoin the unfair competition, and
in so doing, enjoin the libel.
These equitable bases are not mutually exclusive and usually overlap
to at least some degree. As an example, there seems to be no essential
difference between a continuing course of conduct that causes irreparable
harm and an intent to injure the plaintiff in his business by a continued
disparagement of his product. The continuousness of his course of conduct
permits equity to issue an injunction against even one who publishes
injurious false statements without knowing they are false and without
an intent to injure the plaintiff. Also this would cover a trade libel
occurring by negative inference, e.g., when a person gives a purported
full list of merchants offering a particular product and leaves out plaintiff,
a dealer in that product. All these grounds for equitable jurisdiction are
not employed in every state, but a good many states recognize some or all
of them. Indeed it is a rare trade libel that does not fit under one or more
of these headings, thus it can be said that equity will virtually always enjoin
a trade libel, though it may be under the guise of granting relief for some
other wrong.
A great deal of confusion has been engendered in equity by the failure
of the courts to distinguish personal libel and slander from trade libel.
England Ry. Pub. Co., 203 Mass. 470, 89 N.E. 565 (1909); West Willow Realty
Corp. v. Taylor, 23 Misc. 2d 867, 198 N.Y.S.2d 196 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
25. Menard v. Houle, 298 Mass. 546, 11 N.E.2d 436 (1937) ; Lawrence v. Atwood,
295 S.W.2d 298 (Civ. App. Tex. 1956); McMorries v. Hudson Sales Corp., 233
S.W.2d 938 (Civ. App. Tex. 1950).
26. Carter v. Knapp Motor Co., 243 Ala. 600, 11 So. 2d 383 (1943). This
appears to be the only case in which equitable jurisdiction is based upon the fact
that damages cannot be proved at law rather than on the fact that they are
inadequate.
27. Lawrence Trust Co. v. Sun-American Publishing Co., 245 Mass. 262, 139
N.E. 655 (1923) ; Wolf v. Gold, 9 A.D.2d 257, 139 N.Y.S.2d 36 (1959) ; Saxon
v. Torino, 166 Misc. 863, 2 N.Y.S.2d 885 (Sup. Ct. 1938); Yood v. Daly, 37 Ohio
App. 574, 174 N.E. 779 (1930).
28. H. E. Allen Mfg. Co. v. Smith, 224 App. Div. 187, 229 N.Y. Supp. 692
(1928). Nims, Unfair Competition by False Statements or Disparagement, 19 CORNELL
T.

6
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While there are many considerations, such as freedom of speech, that may
compel a court to refuse to enjoin personal libel, these considerations are
not as compelling when trade libel is involved. The former deals with a
personal right, whereas a trade libel, whether oral or written, interferes
with the property right one has in his business. The character of this
injury has led courts to disregard a claim of freedom of speech as a valid
objection to their power to enjoin trade libels. Freedom of speech is not
an absolute right; it is limited by other equally precious freedoms, such
as the right to carry on a business. One does not have the right to employ
free speech maliciously to injure another.2 9' Also, trade libels occurring
in advertisements are purely commercial pronouncements, and hence
would not be protected by the First Amendment. 3 0 Since a merchant's
good will and reputation for handling quality products are his main assets
in attracting the public, a continued and unjustified attack against his
product should be stopped as quickly and as adequately as possible: the
only effective way to accomplish this is by injunction.
When a merchant brings an action to enjoin a trade libel, he is
interested in stopping continuing false statements about his product.
Regardless of what the intent of the defendant may be, the means are the
same - continuing false statements about the plaintiff's product - and
the resulting injury is the same. It is the repetition that makes an injunction the desirable form of relief and the falsity that causes the invasion of
plaintiff's rights - these are the essential elements of the wrong. Courts
recognize this, but, feeling in most cases that this is not a sufficient ground
for equity to intervene, they strain to find another ground for relief.
Then, in effect, they enjoin the trade libel while saying that it is incidental
to the granting of other relief. It would be much simpler and more
straightforward if equity recognized that a continuing product disparagement gives rise to an injury that has no remedy other than an injunction,
31
and directly granted this relief for trade libel.
29. Carter v. Knapp Motor Co., 243 Ala. 600, 11 So. 2d 383 (1943); West
Willow Realty Corp. v. Taylor, 23 Misc. 867, 198 N.Y.S.2d 196 (Sup. Ct. 1960).

30. Commercial publications are not within the First Amendment protection

of freedom of speech. Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm. of Ohio, 236 U.S.

230, 35 Sup. Ct. 387 (1914). This case has been overruled as to motion pictures
because films now convey significant ideas. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S.

495, 72 Sup. Ct. 777 (1956).

It cannot be said that advertisements are significant

media for the expression of ideas, so the Mutual Film doctrine is still applicable to
them. But see, a recent California case, In re Schillaci, 30 U.S. L. Week 2233 (U.S.

1961), which held that a statute which prohibited most advertisements concerning
venereal disease was unconstitutional as an abridgement of freedom of the press. The
court discussed the recent Supreme Court decisions dealing with censorship but did not
allude to the Mutual Film doctrine at all.
31. Note 21 supra. In Menard v. Houle, 298 Mass. 546, 11 N.E.2d 436 (1937) an
injunction was allowed when a person painted a lemon on his car and parked it
in front of an auto agency. The car owner had unjustly demanded that the dealer fix
the car. In McMorries v. Hudson Sales Corp., .233 S.W.2d 938 (Tex. Civ. App.

1950) where there was no allegation of an unjustified demand to fix the car, an
injunction was not allowed. How can this be logically explained to a merchant when
the injury and the adverse
Pound, in Equitable Relief
HARV. L. Rxv. 640 (1915)
strong court would recognize

effect on his business are the same in both cases?
Against Defamation and Injuries to Personalty, 29
felt it would just be a matter of time before some
a cause of action in equity for trade libel.
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III.
RULES OF EVIDENCE IN THE FEDERAL COURTS.

If there is the requisite diversity and a sufficient jurisdictional amount,
then it is advisable to sue for a trade libel in the federal courts where less
stringent rules of evidence have led to a more liberal granting of relief.
The jurisdictional amount is computed as the damages sought, when
the suit is at law, or as the value of the right of the plaintiff to conduct
his business 82 or the value of the good will that is being injured,83 when
the suit is for an injunction. While one must still prove special damages,
the evidentiary requirements are not as strict as in the state courts.
Showing the names of lost customers is still the preferable means of
proving special damages, but if that is not possible then proof of a general
loss of business has been held sufficient.8 In anti-trust actions, federal
courts have shown an increased tendency to allow surveys and market
samplings into evidence to show the amount of sales lost by the plaintiff
as a result of the monopolistic practices of the defendant.8 These surveys
are used to show the demand that there would have been for the product
or service if there had been no interference by the defendant. Also, federal
courts allow these market samplings to be accepted as evidence of loss of
business in an action for disparagement. In the states which require strict
proof of loss of customers, an argument that market surveys based on
scientific samplings are accurate barometers of lost business and are
acceptable in federal courts, may convince the state court that such is
sufficient proof of special damage.86 It is clear that the climate in the federal
courts is based on a more realistic appraisal of the limitations of evidence
in proving loss of customers.
The federal courts have also shown more sympathy to the plight of
the disparaged plaintiff in equity. While state law is controlling since
jurisdiction is based on diversity, federal judges have tended to use their
discretion more freely in deciding that the state court would have issued an
injunction, once any other head of equity jurisdiction has been shown.8 7
32. Everson v. Spaulding, 150 Fed. 517 (9th Cir. 1907).
33. Bourjois, Inc. v. Park Drug Co., 82 F.2d 468 (8th Cir. 1936).
34. "Where it is not possible for the plaintiff to specify the particular customers
lost, special damages for general loss of custom may be recovered." Erick Bowman
Remedy Co. v. Jensen Salsbery Laboratories, Inc., 17 F.2d 255, 260 (8th Cir. 1926).
35. E.g., Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416 (10th Cir. 1952).
In FTC actions concerning false and misleading advertising surveys are admitted to
prove whether a term is capable of deceiving members of the public. Arrow
Metal Products Corp. v. FTC, 249 F.2d 83 (3d Cir. 1957).
36. It should be remembered that a survey is only as good as the pollsters and
the questions asked. One should be prepared to show that the survey he is seeking
to have admitted is taken by a reputable firm and is completely objective and based on
validated principles.
37. Black & Yates v. Mahogony Assoc., 129 F.2d 227 (3d Cir. 1941), cert.
denied, 317 U.S. 672, 63 Sup. Ct. 76 (1942); Paramount Pictures, Inc. v. Leader
Press, Inc., 106 F.2d 229 (10th Cir. 1939); Royer v. Stoody Co., 192 F. Supp. 949
(W.D. Okla. 1961).
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IV.
UNFAIR COMPETITION.

Trade libels are also enjoinable in an action for unfair competition.
This cause of action, the outer limits of which are still undefined, is
growing rapidly in popularity and is probably being applied prospectively
by the federal courts (where the actions have usually been brought) based
on an educated guess as to what the respective state courts would do
when faced with the same situation. 8 Naturally, this remedy is limited
to trade libels uttered by a competitor and thus not every disparagement
of a product can be so redressed. Under this theory of action, any slander,
defamation, or false or misleading representation as to a product made by
a competitor can be enjoined.8 9 The growing scope of this cause -of
action, 40 together with the elimination of the problems of proof encountered in an action to enjoin a trade libel, make this a most attractive form
of relief when competitive products are involved. 41 The development of
this remedy is a recognition by the courts that any sustained campaign
against the quality of a product is not a fair method of competing for
the attention of the buying public and cannot help but injure that product.
To allow unbridled competition in this area would result in chaos with
so many claims and counter-claims being bandied back and forth that
they would confuse rather than enlighten the public.
Another weapon in the arsenal of remedies against trade libel is the
Federal Trade Commission's cease and desist order which is enforceable
only in the federal courts. This remedy is limited, however, in that an
individual cannot institute the proceeding. Although an individual can
register a complaint with the Federal Trade Commission in order to set

the federal machinery into motion, there can be no recovery of damages,
and the FTC is itself limited to overseeing practices which affect or occur
in interstate commerce. Moreover, in delimiting the jurisdiction of the
FTC, the federal courts have narrowly construed the meaning of inter42
state commerce.

38. Eversharp, Inc. v. Pal Blade Co., 182 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1950).
39. Gardella v. Log Cabin Products Co., 89 F.2d 891 (2d Cir. 1937); Kemert
Corp. v. Printing Arts Research Laboratories, Inc., 269 F.2d 375 (9th Cir. 1959);
Bourjois, Inc. v. Park Drug Co., 106 F.2d 229 (10th Cir. 1939).
40. Wolff, Unfair Competition by Truthful Disparagement, 47
(1938).

YAL4

L.J. 1304

41. In an action for unfair competition there is no problem of showing an
intent to disparage or malice. Bourjois, Inc. v. Park Drug Co., 106 F.2d 229
(10th Cir. 1939).
42. FTC v. Bunte Bros., 312 U.S. 349, 61 Sup. Ct. 580 (1941).
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V.
FOREIGN VIEWS CONCERNING TRADE LIBEL.

The development of a cause of action for damages in England has
paralleled that in the United States. 43 To recover for a trade libel in
England, plaintiff must prove the falsity of the statement, malice and special
damages. 44 But under the Defamation Act of 195245 the requirement of
proof of special damage is abrogated when the trade libel is made to cause
damage to a business. The English law regarding injunctions, however,
differs widely from the American view. Under the Judicature Act of 1873,
46
the courts had no problem in finding jurisdiction to enjoin a trade libel.
But in order for the courts to exercise this power, a showing of special
47
damage and proof of the elements needed to recover at law were required.
Since the Defamation Act of 1952 abolishes the requirement of special
damages at law, it appears that an injunction could now also be issued
48
without proof of special damages to one who qualifies under this act.
In Canada, special damages must be shown to recover at law but in equity a
49
showing of actual damages appears to be sufficient to merit an injunction.
The law on the continent in France and Germany has dealt with
trade libels solely on the ground of unfair competition. These countries
go so far as to enjoin any advertising which mentions the product of
another directly or by implication, regardless of whether the statement
is true or false.50 They feel that a comparison by a competitor puts him
in the position of a judge of his own cause and is thus unfair, since there
are no uniform standards for appraisal of the quality of an article. Moreover, the public is not in a position to verify the truth or falsity of the
51
statements made.
(5th ed. 1960).
44. Western Counties Manure Co. v, Lawes Chemical Manure Co., [1874]
L.R. 9 Ex. 218.
45. 15 & 16 Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz. 2, c. 66:
Sect. 3. In an action for slander of goods . . . , it shall not be necessary to
43. GATLEY, LIBEL AND SLANDER 143-150

allege or prove special damage.
(b) if the words are calculated to cause pecuniary damage to the
plaintiff in respect of any

.

. . business held or carried on by

him at the time of the publication.
There have been no cases in England construing this statute but from its
wording, it seems clear that special damages need not be alleged in a suit to
recover for a trade libel.
46. Thomas v. Williams, [1880] 14 Ch. D. 864.
47. White v. Mellin, [1895] A.C. 154.
48. GATLEY, LIBEL AND SLANDER 631-32 (5th ed. 1960).

49. Wood, Disparagement of Title and Quality, 20 CAN. BAR REv. 296, 430
(1942).
50. Wolff, Unfair Competition by Truthfil Disparagement, 47 YALE L.J. 1304
(1938).

51. Reichsgericht II Z.S. Nov. 25, 1932, nw. 33, 71, as found in Wolff supra
note 50 at pp. 1317-18.
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COMMENTS

VI.
SUMMARY.

While the remedy at law for trade libel has shown some signs of
becoming more liberal, there is still a lack of a proper remedy in most
states for this injury. The strict requirements of proof of loss should be
liberalized along the lines outlined above, so that one truly injured in
his business through a disparagement can recover damages for his loss.
The remedy in equity, while adequate in that it affords relief in all properly
pleaded cases, still requires the use of roundabout methods in most jurisdictions to obtain relief. Trade libel should be recognized as a separate
cause of action in equity as a few progressive courts have done already.
In the narrower field of trade libel by a competitor, the action of unfair
competition is an adequate safeguard in so far as it protects against
continuing false statements, but it is submitted that it should be expanded
to cover even true statements about quality made in comparison with
other specific products because of the inherently misleading nature of
such comparisons.5 2 The relief afforded for trade libel has come a long
52. The advertising industry, groups of retailers, groups of broadcasters and
governing authorities over broadcasting have recognized the unfairness of comparative advertising and have promulgated clauses against it in their respective codes
practice. THE STANDARDS
OF PRACTICE OF THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION
OF
ADVERTISING AGENCIES, (1956); THE TELEVISION CODE OF THE NATIONAL ASsOCIATION or BROADCASTERS, (5th ed. 1959). In England the Independent Television
of

Authority bans all commercials which appear to compare the product advertised
with one or more of its rivals, ADVERTISING AGE, Mar. 13, 1961, p. 54.
The question naturally arises of whether the courts of this country should go
so far as to enjoin all comparative advertising. It is a wise policy not to allow
recovery of damages for all comparative advertising. But the issuance of an
injunction stands on a different footing. In equity, even if the statements are true,
comparative advertising of facts not readily verifiable could be enjoined without
any determination of which competitor had the better product. This would be desirable.
Every comparison implies that one of the two things compared is inferior to the
other and hence should not be bought. Also, many truthful statements can be put
in a misleading way so that they appear to degrade the compared product. For
example, one could say that brand X does not contain a certain ingredient that
brand Y does, thus implying that brand X is inferior, while in fact that ingredient
may have no bearing on the quality of the product. Moreover, products are used
by many different people in many different ways and under varied circumstances, so
that a product that is best for one use is not necessarily best for another. Finally,
the seller or manufacturer who wants to distribute his product seldom has the
objectivity required to make a meaningful comparison and thus will only tend to
mislead the consuming public.
Actually from the standpoint of the advertiser himself, it should appear that
comparative advertising is often a poor policy. The mere fact that the rival's
product is mentioned gives it exposure before the public which it ordinarily would
not have. This exposure may lead to one of two possible unfavorable reactions on
the part of the consumer, It may prompt him, out of curiosity or even perversity, to
either examine or buy the disparaged product to see if it is really as inferior as
the advertisement claims. It may also in some cases prompt the consumer to buy
.the product on the theory that if the competitor picked this one manufacturing rival
to disparage from among all competitors in his field, this product is probably better
than the advertiser's. Comparison of products often degenerates into a mudslinging
contest which is subversive of the very object of advertising - to inform the public
as to the existence and quality of the product.
To be balanced against the disadvantages of comparative advertising is a
consideration of the fact that if a person has a superior product he should have a
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way in this century and adequately prevents future harm, but it is
still deficient in recompensing past harm. The continued expansion of this
cause of action may well depend on the advertising industry itself. If
advertising copy is kept moderate then judicial control will probably not
be imposed, but if the industry cannot control itself then judicial sanctions
should be expanded to prevent and compensate for the abuse of one of the
tools that contributes to the prosperity of the economy.
lames G. Lepis
right to tell the public about it. But the manufacturer has ways other than by
degrading his competitors by which he can put his message before the public
effectively. Since there is no objective standard to test quality, it is submitted that
all comparative advertising as to quality should be enjoined as unfair competition,
even though the statements may be true.
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